Security

UltraLocked security model

A clear explanation of what UltraLocked protects, what it does not protect, and which security components are open for review.

Review the public security core Open GitHub

Threat model

Bounded claims are the point.

Protects against

Sensitive files scattered across Photos, Notes, Files, email, and cloud drives
Casual access to private documents
Cloud sync exposure
Device loss with locked vault
Coercive unlock scenarios where duress workflows are configured
Accidental retention of sensitive screenshots and documents

Does not protect against

A fully compromised iOS device
Kernel-level malware or jailbreak compromise
Shoulder surfing or screen recording while unlocked
Weak device passcodes
Legal compulsion or operational mistakes outside the app
Advanced forensic access to an already-unlocked device

Architecture

Local import to encrypted storage

The high-level app flow keeps files local, encrypts vault contents, protects key material with Secure Enclave-backed controls, and uses explicit encrypted transfer when data moves between devices.

User file

Local import

Vault encryption

Secure Enclave-backed key protection

Local encrypted storage

Optional encrypted local transfer

Public Review

What public review does and does not prove

Open components are useful because they make security claims inspectable. They are not a substitute for device-level testing, operational security, or Apple platform trust.

Public review can verify

Shows how public .ultralocked export bundles are encrypted, parsed, authenticated, and bounded
Lets reviewers inspect malformed input handling and tamper-detection tests
Documents the portable transfer format, threat model, and non-goals

Public review does not prove

Prove Apple Secure Enclave internals or biometric enforcement
Prove every runtime behavior of the private App Store client
Eliminate device compromise, weak passcodes, screen exposure, or operational mistakes

Open-source review

Open components for review

The sensitive security architecture is documented, and core security components are available for public review. The goal is not to ask users to blindly trust a black box, but to make the key lifecycle, vault behavior, and limitations inspectable.

Read whitepaper View GitHub Review security components Responsible disclosure

We especially welcome review of

Secure Enclave key lifecycle
vault encryption and deletion semantics
duress workflow edge cases
encrypted transfer model
metadata exposure
recovery-key handling

If you believe you found a security issue, please report it privately first. We will acknowledge good-faith reports and credit researchers when appropriate.

Contact: security@ultralocked.com